Description

Lieutenant-Colonel Fausto LAGINHA dos Ramos (d. 2010). / BATALHÃO DE CAÇADORES No. 2891 (ANGOLA). / BATALHÃO DE CAÇADORES No. 1894 (GUINÉ).

 

[The Military Archive of the Portuguese commando leader Lieutenant-Colonel Fausto Laginha dos Ramos from the Portuguese Colonial War, featuring of 100+ artefacts including “Secret” manuscript and typescript mission plans and over 30 manuscript maps, created in various locations in Angola and Guiné (Guinea-Bissau), 1961 – 1972].

 

A highly valuable and voluminous archive relating to the Portuguese Colonial War, or the ‘Guerra do Ultramar’ (1961-74), an epic conflict whereby Portugal fought to maintain its 400-year-old African colonial empire, simultaneously opposing large-scale and well-organized independence movements in Angola, Guiné (Guinea-Bissau), and Mozambique, forming three hot fronts in the Cold War; here being the military papers of Lieutenant-Colonel Fausto Laginha dos Ramos, who led two Portuguese commando units, ‘Batalhões de Caçadores’ (Hunter’s Battalions), countering guerrilla insurgents in Guiné (1966-8) and Angola (1969-71), conducting dozens of offensive operations along the most active and strategically important zones on both theatres; highlights of the archive include Laginha’s “secret” original manuscript drafts of his advance plans and after action reports for 20 distinct counterguerrilla operations against the PAICG insurgents in the strategic Cacheu District of northwestern Guiné, including 3 mss. sketch maps and a whiteprint map of Laginha’s São Domingos command base and 5 exceedingly rare, mimeographed soldier’s magazines published in the field; Laghina’s “Secret’ typescript advance plans and after-action reports for 21 distinct operations / actions in the critical Uíge District of northern Angola, attacking the FNLA insurgents, illustrated with 28 original manuscript maps; the archive is a uniquely valuable gateway to further academic research, not only into the wars of independence in Angola and Guinea-Bissau, but into the general nature of modern guerilla and counterinsurgency warfare, imbuing the archive with a global resonance, featuring perspectives on operational and tactical planning that are seldom found in public archives or libraries.

 

The Portuguese Colonial War (1961-74), or Guerra do Ultramar, was a definitive event in the modern history of Africa, Portugal and the Cold War.  It came about as Portugal, then ruled by the conservative ‘Estado Novo’ regime, stubbornly maintained its direct rule over its African colonies, even as virtually all other European powers had accepted decolonization.  Armed rebel movements simultaneously developed in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné (Portuguese Guinea, today Guinea-Bissau) that attacked Portuguese government and European settler targets. This provoked a ferocious response from Lisbon, which sent large armies to all three theatres, resulting in a protracted contest between African guerrillas and Portuguese commandos.  In the context of the Cold War, the conflicts came to involve not only the principals, but (indirectly) a wide variety of international players, lending the events a global dimension.

 

At the beginning of the 1960s, Portugal still retained an extensive colonial empire that included (with dates of their establishment as colonies): Cabo Verde (1462); São Tomé & Principe (1486); Mozambique (1506); Goa, India (1510 – but invaded and taken by India in 1961); Macao, China (1557); Angola (1571); Guiné (1588), today Guinea-Bissau; and Timor-Leste (1769), or East Timor, in the Indonesian Archipelago.

 

Importantly, Portugal maintained a profound cultural, economic and political connection to its colonies, arguably much deeper than any other European power ever had with its overseas possessions.  The colonies, technically provinces of Portugal, were theoretically coequal parts of the republic (although this was not the case in reality) and were vital, inalienable parts of Portugal proper, integral to its national identity.

 

While most of the residents of Angola, Mozambique and Guiné in the 1960s likely supported some form of independence for their countries, Angola and Mozambique were home to large white settler populations, while a significant number of indigenous Africans in all three countries supported continued Portuguese rule, due their cultural or economic connections to Portugal.  Indeed, many educated or better off Africans in the cities valued and benefitted from employment and the sense of order provided by the colonial regime, such that they had a lot to lose if the country fell under the rule of indigenous juntas.  Moreover, intermarriage between Portuguese settlers and indigenous people was increasingly common, creating people with merged Portuguese-African identities.

 

However, the ‘Estado Novo’ regime (1926-74), ruled most of the time by the dictator António de Oliveira Salazar, brought in the Colonial Act (1930), which codified an Apartheid-like system of racial discrimination, forced labour and grinding poverty to which the great majority of people in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné were subjected (better off Africans were well-integrated into Portuguese culture and so could be exempted from these harsh circumstances).  They bitterly resented this oppression and had little to lose by rebelling against Portuguese rule.

 

As such, the Guerra do Ultramar was both a series of freedom struggles as well as civil wars.

 

While the Guerra do Ultramar is considered by many to be a single conflict, the contests in each of the different national theatres, in Angola, Mozambique and Guiné, were distinct.  While all theatres included brutal fighting in challenging terrain by Portuguese counter-insurgency units versus highly motivated, and often well-trained and equipped guerrillas, the military outcomes were different.

 

In Angola and Mozambique, the Portuguese gained the upper hand, successfully holding control over the most important parts of the countries, while confining the insurgency to the hinterlands (although the battle along the conflicts’ fault lines were brutal).  By contrast, the war in Guiné, known as ‘Portugal’s Vietnam’, was a nightmarish showdown played out in malarial swamps, whereupon Portugal struggled to hold any territory much beyond the colony’s two main towns.

 

Portugal dedicated enormous military resources to the Guerra do Ultramar, invoking universal male conscription in the homeland to send a total of over 800,000 troops (an astounding commitment for country of 8 million people) to Angola, Guiné and Mozambique through the thirteen years of the war, with an average of 107,000 troops being rotated through Africa at any one time.  In addition, the Portuguese forces included hundreds of thousands of African soldiers drawn for the local population.  In the end, 8,831 Portuguese troops were killed (6,338 being from Metropolitan Portugal), while 15,507 were wounded.

 

The Portuguese had extensive experience fighting in Africa and making deals of various kinds with the locals.  For a colonial Western power, they were relatively well-prepared for the conflict, certainly in relation to the contemporary disastrous mismatch of the Americans in Vietnam.  The key to Portugal’s abilities were their Batalhões de Caçadores (Hunter’s Battalions), or BCaç, which were mobile expeditionary units of around 100-200 commandos each that could operate autonomously in isolated, rugged areas far from major bases.  Their tours were incredibly intense, with the units having to execute multiple operation per month, as such the life of the battalions was usually limited to two years, whereupon the units were dissolved and replaced.  BCaç units mastered techniques of jungle fighting and counter-guerilla warfare and did much to negate the opposition’s homefield advantage.  At the war’s height the Portuguese operated a total of around 400 BCaç units throughout Angola, Guiné, and Mozambique.

 

The present archive concerns the conflicts in both Angola and Guiné, as seen through the eyes of Lt. Col. Fausto Laginha dos Ramos, the leader two successive Batalhões de Caçadores units, fighting first in Guiné (1966-68) and then in Angola (1969-71), in the hottest battles sectors of both theatres.

 

The conflict in Angola, known locally today as the Angolan War of Independence (Guerra de Independência de Angola), was initiated by the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), an armed rebel movement led by Holden Roberto.  The FNLA had a conservative Christian ideological bent, and was dominated by the Bakongo people, who lived in far northern Angola.  The movement originally hoped to overthrow the Portuguese regime in northern Angola and to re-establish the Kingdom of Kongo, a former Bakongo-ruled mega-state that lasted from around 1390 until 1862, controlling northern Angola and much of today’s Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The FNLA was actively supported by Mobutu Sese Seko, the dictator of the Congo.

 

In the early months of 1961, Roberto’s army of 5,000 men swept down from the Congo towards Luanda, committing heinous atrocities upon the civilians they encountered, both white and black alike (these massacres forever discredited the FNLA in the global media).  They took control of what became known as the Zona Sublevada do Norte (ZSN or the Rebel Zone of the North), consisting of the provinces of Zaire, Uíge and Cuanza Norte.

 

In response, the Portuguese leader Salazar, dispatched tens of thousands of troops to Angola to suppress the rebellion, successfully pushing the front line back deep into the Zona Sublevada do Norte, in the Uíge District, which remained the fault line between the Portuguese and the FNLA for the duration of the war.

 

Meanwhile, the left-wing Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), led by António Agostinho da Silva Neto (later the first President of Angola), took control over much of the central and southern interior of the country, opening a new front.

 

Another insurgent movement, the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), led by the famed guerilla leader Jonas Savimbi, espousing an ideologically malleable “Big Tent” philosophy, split from the FNLA in 1966.  The three rebel movements all despised each other, and their lack of coordination (and occasional battles against each other) handed a gift to Portugal.

Portugal’s counterinsurgency operations in Angola continued to be quite successful, spearheaded by the Batalhões de Caçadores.  That being said, the fighting in many places was fearsome, with high casualties on both sides, with some elements of the rebel forces showing themselves to be highly motivated, disciplined and well-armed by the Soviets and Chinese.  The war was especially horrific, as both sides committed terrible atrocities against the civilian populations.  Throughout the conflict, the Portuguese were able to hold the rebel forces into the deep interior, far for the major Portuguese-held coastal cities, such that the Portuguese often referred to the rebel-held territories as the Terras do Fim do Mundo (the Lands of the Far Side of the World).  The immense size of Angola and physical remoteness of the rebel held areas ensured that it was difficult for their foreign allies to send them reinforcements, such that overall, the geography worked in the Portuguese favour.

By the early 1970s, the Portuguese had won a qualified military victory in Angola.  However, the Carnation Revolution (April 25, 1974) that overthrew the Estado Novo regime in Portugal brought in a staunchly anticolonial government.  Portugal thus agreed to fully withdraw from Angola and to recognize the country’s independence, which occurred on November 11, 1975.  Sadly, for Angola, the country was immediately plunged into the 26-year-long Angolan Civil War (1975 – 2002), fought between the former insurgent groups that seemed to dislike each other even more than they resented the Portuguese.

Conversely, the war in Guiné was a nightmare for Portugal.  There, the rebel forces were represented by the Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) (English: African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), a Marxist group, led by the charismatic and clever Amílcar Cabral (1924-73).  There were many factors that gave the PAICG an edge.

 

First, Guiné’s geography was low and swampy, with the landmass dissected by broad river estuaries, so making military movement, particularly with heavy arms, very difficult, with there being unnumerable locations where the insurgents could mount stealth attacks upon Portuguese targets.  The Batalhões de Caçadores, despite their best efforts, seemed to always be on the backfoot.

 

Second, the Guiné was relatively poor compared to Angola and Mozambique, and there were few European settlers there, while the number of local people who had strong economic or emotional attachments to Portugal was comparatively limited.

 

Third, Guiné was relatively small, and all areas of the country could be quite easily reached from neighbouring Senegal and Guinea (Guinea-Conakry, formerly French Guinea), countries which actively supported the PAIGC, such that the rebels could conveniently use these countries as bases for bringing in arms or mounting raids into Guiné.

 

Fourth, the PAIGC was ably led, highly disciplined and well trained, standing in sharp contrast to the general state of their Angolan and Mozambiquan comrades, while eventually being well-armed due to Soviet and Chinese support.  These fighters were able to execute highly complex and daring operations against Portuguese targets that were impressive even by the standards of the best Western armies.

 

During the early period of the war in Guiné, from 1961 to 1965, the Portuguese forces were forced on the defensive, as the PAICG gained popular support throughout the countryside, taking ever more territory.  Eventually, the Portuguese were confined to securely controlling only the areas immediately around the capital, Bissau, and the second town, Bafatá, while the PAICG held around half of the country, with the rest of the territory being a fiercely contested ‘´No Man’s Land’.  The fighting in the malarial swaps was brutal, with high casualties on both sides, leaving the Portuguese demoralized.  From 1965, as the Soviets and the Chinese saw the insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique reach a disadvantageous stalemate, and so decided to move their chips to further support the PAICG, sending them massive shipments of modern arms, which negated the Portuguese technological advantage.  By 1966-7, when Lt. Col. Laginha arrived in Guiné, the Portuguese were on the ropes, struggling to hold any of their outposts beyond the vicinities of Bissau and Bafatá.

 

In 1968, General António de Spínola (who subsequently served briefly as the President of Portugal in 1974) was appointed as the Portuguese Commander-in-Chief in Guiné.  He oversaw a change in strategy.  First, he pursued an ‘Africanization’ policy, whereby he recruited many local people to the Portuguese side, by way of incentives and good treatment, dropping the myopic, racist attitudes of his predecessors.  Second, he arranged for a temporary surge of troops and equipment into Guiné.  Third, he set upon a risky (but ultimately successful) offensive posture, using the navy to strike PAICG targets along the river estuaries, as well as attacking the insurgency’s political leadership, which culminated in the assassination of Amílcar Cabral in January 1973.

 

By early 1974, the Portuguese had retaken much PAICG territory and war became a tough contest between two well-matched opponents, with the decent possibility that Portugal would eventually prevail.  However, as was the case in Angola and Mozambique, after the Carnation Revolution (April 25, 1974), Portugal suddenly agreed to cease the war in Guiné and resolved to leave the country for good.  Portugal recognized Guinea-Bissau’s independence on September 10, 1974.

 

While overshadowed in the American and Asian memory by the roughly contemporary Vietnam War (1955-75), during its time, the Guerra do Ultramar was an international media cause celebre, featuring among the most severe hot fronts of the Cold War.  The USSR, China and many African countries’ support for the insurgents, and the (albeit confusingly inconsistent) support that Portugal received from certain Western powers and agencies (ex. sometimes the CIA) and African Apartheid states such as South Africa and Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe), gave the conflict a global dimension.  The war also represented a national catharsis for Portugal, which drafted a generation of its men into service to fight for 13 years in the jungle, before walking away from its over 400-year-old-plus colonial experience, thus marking its transition to becoming a modern, progressive European country.  For Angola and Guiné, the war gave birth to their independence after centuries of slavery and servitude, but only led to decades of poverty and instability, and in the case of Angola, over a generation of continued civil war.

 

THE ARCHIVE IN FOCUS:

 

The present archive features the secret military papers of Lieutenant Colonel Fausto Laginha dos Ramos (d. 2010), a Portuguese army officer, who was a member of the 15^th Infantry Regiment, whose home base was in Tomar, the city in central Portugal famous for its great Templar castle.  Most notably, Laginha led the Batalhão De Caçadores (BCaç) 1894, fighting the PAICG in northwestern Guiné, from September 1966 to April 1968, and then the Batalhão De Caçadores (BCaç) 2891, countering the FLNA insurgents in northern Angola, from November 1969 to December 1971.  In both theatres, Laginha planned and led dozens of operations against the insurgents in what were amongst the most strategically critical and active sectors in both theatres.  While not all his actions went to plan, overall Laginha was a highly successful counterguerrilla commander, as his missions often succeeded in degrading the enemy, capturing weapons, and interfering with their supply lines, while protecting Portuguese assets.

 

The present voluminous archive, which features over a 100 artefacts, most being manuscripts and typescript, illustrated by dozens of maps, presents a wealth of information and a uniquely valuable gateway to further academic research, not only into the wars of independence in Angola and Guinea-Bissau, but into the general nature of modern guerilla and counterinsurgency warfare, imbuing the archive with a global resonance, featuring perspectives on operational and tactical planning and military cartography occurring in high-stress, fast moving situations, that are seldom found in public archives or libraries.

 

We have divided the archive into 3 coherent, chronologically and geographically defined sections.

 

Part I. Luanda, Early 1960s is brief section that concerns Major Laginha’s time as an infantry training officer in Luanda.  It includes a copiously illustrated shapirographed training manual, made in Portugal, in 1949, that demonstrates some of the tactics later refined and adapted in the field by the BCaç units.  Intriguingly, there are also two typescript ‘PSYOPS’, or phycological warfare, manuals, made by Laginha and his colleagues to justify Portugal’s continued presencd in Angola while defining the insurgents as “banditos”.

 

Part II. Guiné (Guinea-Bissau), 1966 – 1968 covers the period when Laginha was commander of the Batalhão de Caçadores (BCaç) 1894, in the São Domingos areas of Cacheu District, in northwestern Guiné.  It includes several his manuscript papers concerning his plans to set up his new command along with a detailed whiteprint map of his São Domingos base.  The highlight of the section is as series of Laginha’s “secret” original manuscript drafts of his advance plans and after-action reports for 20 distinct counterguerrilla operations against the PAICG.  This is followed by 5 exceedingly rare, mimeographed soldier’s magazines published in Guiné.

 

Part III. Angola, 1969 – 1971 concerns the period when Laginha commanded the Batalhão de Caçadores (BCaç) 2891, based in Damba, in the Uíge District) of interior northern Angola, whereupon they battled the FLNA guerillas.  First in line are a magazine and original photographs concerning Laginha’s investiture as the commander.  The highlight of the section is a large collection of Laginha’s “Secret’ typescript advance plans and after-action reports for 21 distinct antiguerrilla operations / actions that the BCaç 2891 launched against the FNLA, illustrated with 38 original manuscript maps.  This is followed by a diverse collection of documents regarding the battalion’s return home to Tomar.

 

 

PART I: LUANDA, Early 1960s

 

During the early part of Guerra do Ultramar (roughly 1961 to 1965), then Major Fausto Laginha dos Ramos was a staff training officer at the Batalhão de Instrução (Instruction / Training Battalion) at the Regimento de Infanteria de Luanda, in the Angolan capital.  This small, but intriguing, section features an incredibly rare and copiously illustrated shapirographed training manual made by the army in Lisbon for schooling infantry officers, as well as two successive versions of Major Laginha’s fascinating manual on PSYOPS, or psychological warfare, that he and his colleagues made in Luanda in 1961 and 1963.

 

1.

CENTRO DE INSTRUÇÃO DE SARGENTOS MILICIANOS DE INFANTARIA; Jacques-Marie-Daniel de DAINVILLE (Author); José Junqueira dos Reis (Translator); Liberto Mártires Conceição (Designer and Illustrator).

 

A.B.C. do comandante de Secção e Pelotão no Combate.

 

[Lisbon:] Centro de Instrução de Sargentos Milicianos de Infantaria, 1949.

 

4° (27 x 21.5 cm): [3 ff.], 296 pp., [1 f.], plus red endpapers, printed in shapirograph in purple (save for covers and title, which are lithographed) with innumerable illustrations imbedded within text, bound in original printed card covers, marked on title as ‘SECRETO’ and as ‘Exemplar No. 11’ (Good condition, but with some tide marking to bottom margin of entire book, slightly affecting printed area on covers and first 5 leaves but not touching printed area elsewhere, else internally clean and bright, some staining and shelf-wear to covers).

 

This is an extremely rare and detailed shapirographed training manual, marked on the title as ‘Secreto’ and numbered as Exemplar No. 11, was issued in Lisbon to train infantry officers.  It features many dozens of well-executed and even amusing illustrations.  It is a translation of the popular manual commissioned by the French Army, Captain J. de Dainville’s A. B. C. du petit chef d’infanterie au combat: groupe et section de voltigeurs (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1948), illustrated by Jan Maky, but has here been entirely reprinted from new matrices.  Evidently, the manual, classified in the Portugal realm, was issued in only a handful of individually numbered examples; we can trace only a single other example, held by the Portuguese Arquivo Histórico Militar.

 

The manual provides fascinating insights into the training and some of the tactics that would be modified and employed by Laginha’s the BCaç 1894 in Guiné and BCaç 2891 in Angola (References: Arquivo Histórico Militar: PT/AHM/FE/040/0444).

 

2.

Fausto LAGINHA dos Ramos.

Acção psico-social – “Conversas Escritas” / 1a. Incorporação. / Regimento de Infanteria De Luanda, Escola de Recrutas I.

Luanda: Escola de Recrutas I, Regimento de Infanteria de Luanda, 1961.

 

Typescript (tall quarto), [17 ff. unnumbered], some leaves printed on both sides, original paper covers with title on front cover, stapled (Very Good, some neat underlining in coloured crayon in few places).

 

This fascinating typescript psychological warfare manual, made for internal consumption at the infantry training academy in Luanda was compiled by then Major Laginha in July 1961.  It features a series of ‘Written Conversations’ that re-enforce notions of Portuguese national identity (Portugal is an indivisible pluricontinental empire and its unifying language is Portuguese) and the Angolan insurgents are ‘Banditos’.  These notions were to be ingrained into the Portuguese officer corps in Angola, not only to toughen their resolve, but to be used by them when interrogating insurgents, seeking to convince them that there was no point in supporting the ‘brigands’.  We cannot trace another example of this “1^st edition” of Laginha’s manual.

 

3.

Fausto LAGINHA dos Ramos, Editor.

Acção psicológica pequenas histórias, grandes verdades. Trabalho dos Subalternos de Batalhão de Instrução; corrigido e compilado pelo Comandante do Batalhão.

Luanda: Regimento de Infanteria de Luanda, Batalhão De Instrução, April 1963.

 

Oblong 8° (22 x 16.5 cm): eccentric pagination with collation complete [1 p. table of contents, inside front cover], [69 pp. total], with some section titles heightened in mss. black pen, original paper covers with title to front cover, stapled (Very Good).

 

This is an almost completely revised version of the former manual, featuring different “Written Conversations” compiled by Laginha’s officer colleagues that seek to present “Short Stories, Big Truths”.  The brief articles dial down on the notion of Portugal’s national identity, the purpose of Portugal’s fight to keep Angola, and notion that the insurgents are “bandits” unworthy of the support of the Angolan people.  This manual, issued in April 1963, is far more sophisticated that the previous version.  We cannot trace a reference to another example of this issue; however, Stanford University Library holds what seems to be a third edition, created later in 1963 (References: Cf. (different, probably 3^rd ed.): Stanford University Library: DT611.75 .A27 1963; OCLC: 38781384).

 

 

PART II: GUINÉ (GUINEA-BISSAU), 1966 – 1968

 

In the summer of 1966, then Lieutenant Colonel Fausto Laginha dos Ramos was appointed as the commander of the newly formed Batalhão de Caçadores 1894 (part of the 15^th Infantry Regiment), which was to operate in the Guiné theatre, where the Portuguese were on the backfoot.  He was soon informed that his unit was to be deployed to a particularly important battle sector in the São Domingos-Suzana area of the Cacheu District, located in the far northwest of Guiné.  This was located upon a narrow strip of Guiné territory between the wide Cacheu River and the Senegalese border.  The area was always hotly contested, as the PAICG had strong local support, while the proximity to Senegal gave them a safe and easy base of operations.  It was one of the most challenging and strategically important postings in Guiné, and Laginha’s appointment was a sign of the esteem in which he was held by the army high command.

 

In September 1966, Laginha was sent to work out of the office of the army Commander-in-Chief in Guiné, in Bissau, where he worked upon assembling men, arms, supplies in preparation for BCaç 1894’s deployment to Cacheu.

 

Laginha, at the head of 167 men, arrived at São Domingos in October 1966, and almost immediately commenced military operations.  While the Portuguese were then generally on the defensive in Guiné, Laginha’s orders were to take the offensive in his sector.  He planned and executed numerous operations (raids) against enemy lines at Canja and Campada, seeking to wear the enemy down, capture or disable their equipment, and to interfere with their supply lines to Senegal.  Laginha also sought to protect and consolidate the areas that were under Portuguese control.

 

Over the coming year and half, BCaç 1894 suffered high casualties, as all the operations were high-risk, and conducted in jungle-covered, swampy terrain, perfect cover for enemy ambushes.  However, Laginha led his men to notable success, as several of his operations achieved their objectives.  Of note, Operations “Dumdum”, “Drambuie I”, ” Derrubante II and III” and “Despeneirar” were perhaps the most successful (many of Laginha’s original manuscript papers for these operations are present here!), as they resulted in the capture of great caches of enemy weapons, cumulatively including 18 machine guns, 101 rifles, 2 rocket launchers and 28,110 small rounds of ammunition.

 

After what was universally considered to be a ‘job well done’, Laginha and BCaç 1894 were relieved and replaced by a fresh unit in early April 1968.  In recognition of his merit, Laginha was awarded with an important field command in Angola.

 

The Guiné section of the present archive is divided into four parts (A–D).  This first, A. Headquarters Reports in Bissau, features the printed map of Guiné that Laginha would have been given when he arrived in Bissau, being a vital strategic aid.  This is followed by a series of 8 manuscript draft memos by Laghina, for submission to his superiors, concerning his preparations for taking command in the field.

 

1966. Mission Planning in São Domingos concerns documents that Laginha made or consulted as he arrived in the field in October 1966. First, is a detailed whiteprint map of BCaç 1894’s base in São Domingos. Next, is a series of 10 ‘Confidential’ manuscript drafts of reports, written by Laginha, regarding intelligence in Cacheu.  This includes information gained from interviews with local informants, the political leanings of the local people and their chiefs, and specific matters regarding the defense of Portuguese-held territory, notably the strategically vital Elia Island, which guarded the mouth of the Cacheu River.

 

1968. Operational Reports from São Domingos is an important section that features 42 original manuscript documents, most of which are “Secret” draft advance plans for mission, “Ordem de Operações”, or after-action reports “Comentários” for over 20 specifically named BCaç 1894 operations against the PAICG forces in the São Domingos-Suzana-Ingoré areas of the Cacheu District, between October 1966 to February 1968. The mission plans and reports, authored by Laginha, are all highly detailed (3 also include manuscript sketch maps) and lend amazing insights into the nature of modern counter-guerilla warfare.

 

Finally, D. Soldiers’ Magazines, features five issued mimeographed ephemeral periodicals made by Portuguese troops in Guiné.

 

1. HEADQUARTERS REPORTS IN BISSAU

 

1.

MINISTÉRIO DAS COLÓNIAS (PORTUGAL), JUNTA DE INVESTIGAÇÕES DO ULTRAMAR.

Carta da provincia da Guiné. / 1:500.000.

Lisbon: Litografia de Portugal, 1961.

 

Colour lithograph with a few contemporary mss. additions in pencil (Very Good, slight wear along old folds), 66 x 89 cm.

 

The is the copy of the official map of Guiné made by the Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, Portugal’s colonial mapping agency, that Laginha acquired upon arriving in Bissau.  It showcases the country’s very difficult topography, with swampy lowlands pierced by numerous wide river estuaries, creating great obstacles to the Portuguese war effort.  Here one can see how the strategic São Domingos area is sandwiched between the Cacheu River and the Senegalese border (which was used as a base for the PAICG).

 

2.

Fausto LAGINHA dos Ramos .

A Collection of 8 Manuscript Memoranda on Field Preparations in the Cacheu District, labelled “Chef do Estado Maior do QG/CTIG”, Marked “Urgente” and “Confidencial”.

Bissau, September 1966.

 

“8/OP – September 19, 1966”, (3 pp.); “9/OP – September 20, 1966”, (2 pp.); “10/OP – September 21, 1966”, (2pp.); “11/OP – September 21, 1966” (2 pp.); “12/OP – September 22, 1966”, (2 pp.); “13/OP – September 22, 1966”, (1 p.); “14/OP – September 23, 1966”, (3 pp.); “15/OP – September 23, 1966”, (1 p.).

 

 

1. MISSION PLANNING IN SÃO DOMINGOS

 

1.

MINISTÉRIO DO EXÉRCITO – SERVIÇO DE FORTIFICAÇÕES E OBRAS MILITARES.

Esboço Topgraphico = S. Domingos = / 1 Outubro 1966.

(Probably Bissau), October 1966.

Whiteprint map with carbon copy legend sheet (A1 size) stapled to upper left corner (Good, clean and crisp but oxidized along old folds as is common with whiteprints), 64 x 93 cm.

 

This a detailed whiteprint plan of the Portuguese army base in São Domingos, made by army engineers, dated October 1, 1966.  Later that same month, Laginha’s BCaç 1894 would assume possession of the base, which it would use as its headquarters until April 1968.  The map features an attached key sheet identifying the numbered buildings and facilities in the base, including the officer’s mess, Commander’s (Laginha’s) office, barracks, chapel, prison, primary school (for the children of local pro-Portuguese civilians), water and electrical sheds, as well as many other sites, while the tennis courts are marked other map proper.

 

Fausto LAGINHA dos Ramos .

Collection of 10 Manuscript Reports on Intelligence Matters in the Cacheu District, Marked “Confidencial”.

São Domingos, October 1966.

 

1. i) “Jobel-Arame”, October 18, 1966 (4 pp.).
2. ii) “2a Rep.”, “Notas complementoses á fiche de Interrogatório de Ambrósio Gomes”, October 19, 1966 (3 pp.).

iii) “3a Rep.”, “Colaboração da popualação de Elia…”, October 20, 1966 (7 pp.) – local chief, etc.

1. iv) “Rotação de Militares”, no date but October 1966 (2 pp.).
2. v) “Normas para controle de Carça”, no date but October 1966 (5 pp.).
3. vi) “Tranferência de commando… para S. Domingos”, no date but October 1966. (3 pp.).

vii) “Auto Defensa de Elia”, no date but October 1966 (1 p.).

viii) “Auto Defensa – Armamento” (1), no date but October 1966 (2 pp.).

1. ix) “Auto Defensa – Armamento” (2), no date but October 1966 (1 p.).
2. x) “Auto Defensa – Armamento” (3), no date but October 1966 (1 p.).

 

3.

Fausto LAGINHA dos Ramos .

A Collection of 3 Draft Muster Rolls for the Batalhão de Caçadores 1894.

São Domingos, October 1966.

 

These documents show that BCaç 1894 consisted of 166 or 167 troops and it divides the muster into various categories and roles.

 

1. a) “Comando e CCS/BCaç 1894”, October 22, 1966 (3 pp. + 2 pp. on small paper).

 

1. b) “Comando e CCS/BCaç 1894”, S. Domingos, October 24, 1966, mss. of the same with notes (2 pp.)

 

1. c) Companhia commandos e Serviços / C.C.S. 1894 / Relacao das Pracas desta Companhia, com Especialidad e Situação, November 19, 1966 (Typescript, 2 pp.).

 

 

1. OPERATIONAL REPORTS FROM SÃO DOMINGOS

 

N.B.: All Documents in this section are authored by Lt. Col. Fausto Laghina dos Ramos and are in Good to Very Good condition unless otherwise stated.

 

1.

“Relatorio de comando no. 3 período 24 nov 66 a 24 dez 66”.

São Domingos, January 15, 1967.

Manuscript, 12 ff. (tall quarto), pencil, 1 f. notes tipped in (trimmed irregularly lower right corner with tiny loss).

 

2.

“Logistica”.

São Domingos (Early 1967).

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

3.

“OP “DumDum””.

São Domingos (Early 1967).

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil (trimmed irregularly lower right corner with tiny loss).

 

4.

“OP “Diva””.

São Domingos (Early 1967).

Manuscript, 2 ff. (tall quarto), pencil (trimmed irregularly lower right corner with tiny loss).

 

5.

Generos fornecidos ao pessoal da desmatação. / Novembro.

São Domingos, December (1966).

Typescript in blue, 1 f.

 

“OP “Bafata””.

São Domingos, October 18k, 1966. 

Manuscript, 2 ff. (tall quarto), pencil (trimmed irregularly lower right corner with tiny loss).

 

“Suzana”.

São Domingos, April 3, 1967.

Manuscript, 8 ff. (octavo), pencil.

 

“Destacamento de Suzana”.

São Domingos, April to June, 1967.

Manuscript, 29 ff. (mixture of octavo and tall quarto leaves), blue pen.

 

9.

“MSG do Dest. Suzana”.

São Domingos, June, 1967.

Manuscript, 5 ff. (tall quarto), blue pen.

 

10.

“MSG do Dest. Varela”.

São Domingos, June, 1967.

Manuscript, 3 ff. (tall quarto), blue pen, with 2 ff. of notes on octavo tipped in.

 

“Elementos corridos sobre “Bugim””.

São Domingos, Spring 1967.

Manuscript, 6 ff. (tall quarto), black pen.

 

12.

1. CANDEILA.

“15 a 31 MAR 67 – Informações”.

Guiné, April 10, 1967.

Manuscript, 2 pp. (tall quarto), black pen.

 

13.

“Punição do for mil Manuel José Batista da CCS/CCac 1894”.

São Domingos, April 30, 1967.

Manuscript, 16 ff. (tall quarto), pencil and blue pen, with 1 f. of notes on octavo tipped in.

 

14.

“Operações Especials”.

São Domingos, July 20, 1967.

Manuscript, 3 ff. (octavo), pencil.

 

15.

“OP “Destimida””.

São Domingos, Summer 1967.

Manuscript, 1 ff. (octavo), pencil.

 

16.

“João Uloma”.

São Domingos, October 9, 1967.

Manuscript, 2 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

17.

“Antonio Vasconcellos”.

São Domingos, September 18 and 18, 1967.

Manuscript, 1 ff., with mss. sketch map on verso, 2 ff. (tall quarto), pencil, plus 1 f. octavo notes.

 

18.

“Cassum”.

“Punição do for mil Manuel José Batista da CCS/CCac 1894”.

São Domingos, July 19, 1967.

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil (some wear with tiny loss to last leaf).

 

19.

“Ordem de Operações no. 97 / OP “Derrubante”, marked “Secreto”.

São Domingos, September 20, 1967.

Manuscript, 4 ff., 3 ff. annex (tall quarto), blue pen.

 

“Ordem de Operações no. 99 / “OP Degêlo”, marked “Secreto”.

São Domingos, September 22, 1967.

Manuscript, 4 ff., 3 ff. (tall quarto), blue pen.

 

“Ordem de Operações / OP “Drambuie II”, marked “Secreto”.

São Domingos, June 1967.

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

22.

“Ordem de Operações / OP “Destruir”, marked “Secreto”.

São Domingos, March 1967.

Manuscript, 7 ff., plus 2 ff. annex (tall quarto), pencil.

 

23.

“Plano de Operações no. 35 / OP “Destforra”, marked “Secreto”.

São Domingos, April 1967.

Manuscript, 4 ff., plus 2 ff. annex (tall quarto), pencil.

 

24.

“Plano de Operações no. 60 / OP “Descampar”, marked “Secreto”.

São Domingos, June 1967.

Manuscript, 5 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

25.

“Comentário á OP “Descangar” realizada… 27 nov 67.

São Domingos, December 1967.

Manuscript, 2 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

26.

“Comentário á OP “Descamapar I” realizada… 11 jul 67.

São Domingos, July 15, 1967.

Manuscript, 2 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

27.

“Comentário á OP “Degêlo” realizada… 22 sep 67.

São Domingos, October 5, 1967.

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

28.

“Comentário á OP “Despeneirar” realizada… 28 sep 67.

São Domingos, October 12, 1967.

Manuscript, 8 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

29.

“Realtório preliminar da OP “Despeneirar” … 28 sep 67.

São Domingos, October 1967.

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

30.

“Comentário á OP “Derrubante II”.

São Domingos, October 11, 1967.

Manuscript, 9 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

31.

“Ordem de Operações no. 121 / OP “Duloma I”, marked “Secreto”.

São Domingos, October 13 1967.

Manuscript, 5 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

32.

“Comentário á OP “Derrubante III”.

São Domingos, October 16, 1967.

Manuscript, 10 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

33.

Relatório Preliminar” (Notes on various operations written from Suzana).

Suzana, October 23, 1967.

Manuscript, 3 ff. (tall quarto), pencil and blue pen.

 

“Comentário á OP “Duloma” na área de cassum, em 23 out 67”.

São Domingos, November 1967.

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

35.

Rough notes regarding Operations “Dukloma” and “Despeneirar”, October 1967.

4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

“Ordem de Operações no. 143 / OP “Desancar”, marked “Secreto”.

São Domingos, November 11, 1967.

Manuscript, 3 ff., 1 f. annex (tall quarto), blue pen.

 

37.

“Comentário á OP “Desafiar” realizada na área de Antiga …em 18 nov 67”.

São Domingos, November 30, 1967.

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

38.

“Ordem de Operações no. 195 / OP “Dó-lhe com Geito”, marked “Secreto”.

São Domingos, January 11, 1968.

Manuscript, 3 ff., 1 f. annex (tall quarto), blue pen, plus mss. map, “OP Dó-lhe com Geito” (pencil and crayon).

 

“Comentário á OP “Desbaratar” realizada na área de Barraca…em 4 dez 67”.

São Domingos, January 25, 1968.

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil, plus mss. map, “Operação a Barraca-Bolanha – B.Tara-B-Biró / OP “Desbaratar” (pencil and crayon).

 

40.

“Comentário á OP “Dó-lhe com Geito” realizada em 28 e 29 jan 68”.

São Domingos, February 1968.

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

41.

“Comentário á OP “Bate de Esguelha” realizada em 20 e 21 jan 68”.

São Domingos, February 1968.

Manuscript, 6 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

42.

“OP “Corrida Final” / Nota justificative do “Conceito da operação” e missões dele Decorrentes”.

São Domingos, (February 1968).

Manuscript, 4 ff. (tall quarto), pencil.

 

 

1. SOLDIERS’ MAGAZINES

 

Here are 5 issues of exceedingly rare, ephemeral mimeographed ‘solders’ magazines, made by Portuguese troops in Guiné to serve as a distraction from the stress of fighting while between operations.  This follows a long history of such periodicals made by troops in various theatres around the world since the 19^th century.

 

1.

BATALHÃO DE CAÇADORES 1894; Fausto LAGINHA Dos Ramos, Director; Tomás Marques Afonso, Editor.

Estrela do Norte magazine, 3 issues:

 

a)

Estrela do Norte, São Domingos, Guiné: BCaç 1894 [unnumbered, undated, but November 1967].

Tall quarto (34 x 22 cm): [2], 10 pp. mimeographed, original printed paper covers, with numerous illustrations imbedded within text, printed on variously coloured paper, stapled (Very Good, very staining to gutters).

 

b)

Estrela do Norte, São Domingos, Guiné: BCaç 1894 [unnumbered, undated, but January 1968].

Tall quarto (34 x 22 cm): [2], 13 pp. mimeographed, original printed paper covers, with numerous illustrations imbedded within text, printed on variously coloured paper, stapled (Good, some wear and staining to gutters).

 

c)

Estrela do Norte, São Domingos, Guiné: BCaç 1894 [unnumbered, undated, but February 1968].

Tall quarto (34 x 22 cm): 13 pp. mimeographed, original printed paper covers, with numerous illustrations imbedded within text, printed on variously coloured paper, stapled (Fair, some marked staining and some small loss to gutters of last 2 leaves).

 

Here are 3 issued of the Estrela do Norte, the magazine mimeographed by the BCaç 1894 at their base in São Domingos.  Each issue features war news, battalion news, poems, Catholic religious messages, games, social interest stories, history lessons, football scores from Portugal, etc., all richly illustrated.  Only a handful of examples of each issue would have been made, while they would have had a very low survival rate.  Today, the magazine is extremely rare; we cannot trace the current locations of any other examples of any of the issues.

 

2.

COMANDO TERRITORIAL INDEPENDENTE DA GUINÉ; Brigadier Brig. Anselmo Guerra CORREIA.

Azimute magazine, 2 issues.

 

a)

Azimute, no. 18, [Bissau:] Comando Territorial Independente da Guiné, December 1966.

Tall quarto (34 x 22 cm): 14 pp. mimeographed, original printed paper covers, with numerous illustrations imbedded within text, printed on variously coloured paper, stapled (Good, some wear and staining with some tiny loss to a few leaves).

 

 

 

b)

Azimute, no. 19 [‚Christmas Issue’], [Bissau:] Comando Territorial Independente da Guiné, December 1966.

Tall quarto (34 x 22 cm): [2], 13 pp. mimeographed, original printed paper covers, with numerous illustrations imbedded within text, printed on variously coloured paper, stapled (Good, some wear and staining to gutters).

 

These are two issues of the mimeographed magazine published by the central command of the Portuguese army in Guiné, the Comando Territorial Independente da Guiné, issued in Bissau, in December 1966.  The richly illustrated issues feature articles on war news, global travel, sports news for Portugal, social interest stories, historical subjects, poetry and on ‘Cães de Guerra’ (War Dogs).  As with the Estrela do Norte, all issues of the magazine are extremely rare, we cannot trace the current locations of any issues.

 

Tipped into one of the editions is a mimeographed propaganda flyer with map of Guiné, bearing the motto: ‘Guiné Portuguese É e será sempre Portugal’ (‘Portuguese Guinea Is and Always will be Portugal’).

 

PART III: ANGOLA, 1969 – 1971

 

This section concerns the Guerra do Ultramar in the Zona Sublevada do Norte (ZSN or the Rebel Zone of the North), which occurred the districts of Zaire, Uíge and Cuanza Norte.  Here Portuguese BCaç units fought the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA),

(National Front for the Liberation of Angola) along a lengthy front that straddled jungles, mountains, coffee fields and deep ravines.  The Portuguese held and advantage in that they were well supplied from their coastal strongholds and were able to hold many of the region’s major cities and towns.  However, the FNLA fighters, who earlier in the war essentially acted as a giant unhinged mob, had since developed a sense of discipline and focus, supplied via the Democratic Republic of Congo (home the many of their ethnic Bakongo brethren) with modern weapons from the Soviet Union and China.

 

Unlike the fluid situation in Guiné, the Portuguese held the upper hand and from the mid-1960s onward were able to successfully contain the FNLA to remote areas.  However, this containment came at price, as the Portuguese could never rest on their laurels – not even for a minute – and had to mount constant operations (often taking high casualties) to keep the FLNA in check.  Failure to do so could open a gap in the Portuguese defenses, and allow the insurgents to break towards Luanda, as they did in 1961.

 

Specifically, here are Lt. Col. Fausto Laginha dos Ramos’s original papers from the period when he led the Batalhão de Caçadores 2891, from December 1969 to November 1971, based in Damba, in the Uíge District (until 1961 called the ‘Congo’ district, today the Uíge Province).  Damba, an import regional centre in Angola’s great coffee-growing region, lay immediately along the hottest fault line between the Portuguese and the FNLA forces.  Critically, this was where the insurgents could potentially break the Portuguese cordon militaire and rush towards Luanda, such that maintaining the line here was of the upmost importance.

 

The BCaç 2891’s objectives were to secure Portuguese-controlled territory, especially keeping the major towns safe from FLNA attack, and conquering enemy territory where possible; mounting raids that could deplete the enemy’s strength and seize or disable their arms; and to interrupt the FLNA’s supply lines which led towards the Congo.  While these objectives were similar to Laginha’s former mandate in Guiné, the operations in the Uíge District tended to be on a larger scale and less frequent, with some missions being conducted in conjunction with other BCaç units, against sizable enemy bases.  The missions were classified as either “Operaraçãos” (Operations), being large scale endeavours, or smaller “Acçãos” (Actions).

 

The first part of the section, A. The Assignment, features material relating to Laginha’s appointment as the commander of BCaç 2891.

 

The nucleus of the Uíge, Angola section is B. “Operaraçãos e Comentarios”: Battle Plans and Maps, which features 37 documents (many with multiple parts) that consists of typescript copies of many Laghina’s original advance battle plans and after-action reports.  These operational and action reports were stamped “SECRETO” and made in a handful of (often numbered) copies to be distributed to Laghina’s subordinate offers, or the commanders of other BCaç units who many have be co-executed the missions.

 

Present here are documents regarding 9 Operations and 11 Actions, illustrated with a total of 28 manuscript maps.  While the size and format of the advance operational plans sometimes varied, they tended to follows a set format, with text describing 1) The Situation, including the status of the Enemy (targets) and the other Portuguese forces involved.; 2) the Mission, describing the aims and parameters of the operation; 3) The Execution, describing how the various detachments of the battalion, or battalions, were supposed to advance to pre-arranged coordinates (either enemy targets or rendezvous points), with an emphasis upon the clear synchronization of forces; 4) Administration and Logistics, which includes the resources needed to support the mission; and 5) Command and Communications, concerning how Laginha was to guide and communicate with his troops while the operations were ongoing.  Some of the reports are augmented by annexes.

 

Critically, the operation / action plans were illustrated with manuscript maps, which featured the planned play-out of the missions, showing the intended lines of movement and the objectives of the various battle detachments.  These maps were drafted upon tracing paper, taking topographic details from the relevant sheets of the Junta de Investigações do Ultramar’s Carta de Angola 1:100.000 (Lisbon, 1969), which was by far and away the most accurate and detailed published sectional map of the country.

 

Laginha’s reports and maps lend amazingly vivid insights into the actual mechanics of how modern counterinsurgency operations played out on the ground, from perspectives rarely captured in literature on such conflicts.

 

1. The Return Home to Portugal (End 1971 – Beginning 1972), features diverse material concerning Laginha and BCaç 2891’s return to Portugal.

 

1. THE ASSIGNMENT

 

This short section, but important for documentary purposes, features a copy of O de 15 de Tomar (Year 11, No. 17, November 30, 1969), the official magazine of the 15^th Infantry Regiment of the Portuguese Army (to which Laginha and his battalions belonged), based in Tomar.  This issue features an article, illustrated with photographs, on the ceremony in Tomar, that whereupon Laghina was appointed as the commander of the newly constituted BCaç 2891 earlier that month.  Appended to the magazine is a short manuscript note from the Commandant of the Tomar base to Laginha, with four original photographs from the event.

 

1. “OPERARAÇÃOS e COMENTARIOS”: BATTLE PLANS AND MAPS

 

This highly important section, fronted by a manuscript title sheet that reads “Operaraçãos e Comentarios”, contains Laginha’s aforementioned operational papers.

 

N.B.: All Documents in this section are authored by Lt. Col. Fausto Laginha dos Ramos and are in Good to Very Good condition unless otherwise stated.

 

1.

“OP. “BUSCA” / Orden de Operações, no. 03/70”.

Damba, February 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, Labelled “Exemplar No. 8”.

Typescript (tall quarto), 4 pp., 1 folding mss. map (colored pen and marker) on tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript, bound in original printed green paper wrappers (Very Good condition, front cover loose).

 

2.

“Aditamento No. 1 Anexo A (Transparente de Operações) á O.O.P. “Busca” (AC “NAIPES” / Confirmacão de Ordens Vebais”.

Damba, February 1970.

Mss. map (colored marker and pencil) on a folio sheet of tracing paper.

 

3.

“OP. “CATA” / Orden de Operações, no. 04/70”.

Damba, March 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, Labelled “Exemplar No. 8”.

Typescript (tall quarto), 4 pp., 1 folding mss. map (colored pen and marker) on tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript with mss. additions in pencil, bound in original printed green paper wrappers.

 

4.

“OP. “CAÇA” / Orden de Operações, no. 05/70”.

Damba, March 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, Labelled “Exemplar No. 9”.

Typescript (tall quarto), 4 pp., 1 folding mss. map (colored pen and marker) on tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript with mss. additions in pencil, bound in original printed green paper wrappers.

 

5.

Sitrep circunstaniado no. 13/70 do com sec UIG período de 210800A a 290800 AMAR70”.

(Damba March 28, 1970).

Marked ‘Copia do’.

Typescript single page (small quarto) with mss. noted in. pencil.

 

6.

Stray Mss. Sketch Map on tracing paper (coloured marker and pencil).

(Damba March-April 1970).

This manuscript is an ‘after action report’ map, showing the routes of several of the season’s operations, including for OPS “ABERURA” (February 2 to 11, 1970); “DÚVIDA” (May 13 to 18, 1970).; “CATA” (April 4 to 9, 1970) and AC “ZIGUE-ZAGUE” (March 25 to 29, 1970).

 

7.

“OP. DÚVIDA” / Orden de Operações, no. 06/70”.

Damba, May 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typescript (tall quarto), 5 pp., 1 folding mss. map (colored pen, crayon and marker) on tracing paper, 3 pp. typescript, bound in original printed green paper wrappers.

 

8.

“OP “DERIVA” / Orden de Operações, no. 07/70”.

Damba, May 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typescript (tall quarto), 4 pp., 1 folding mss. map (colored pen, crayon and marker) on tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript, bound in original printed green paper wrappers

 

9.

“AC “LOIRA” / Transparente de Operações and Annexo Transmissões”.

Damba, June 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, “Exemplar No. 4”.

Typsecript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon and pencil) on a single folio sheet of tracing paper.

 

10.

“AC “LOTUS” / Transparente de Operações”.

Damba, July 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, Labelled ‘Exemplar No. 4’.

Typsecript text and mss. folding map (colored pen, crayon and marker and pencil) on folio sheet of tracing paper.

 

11.

“OP “EMPURRA” / Orden de Operações, no. 08/70”.

Damba, July 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, ‘Labelled Exemplar No. 9’.

Typescript (tall quarto), 7 pp., 1 mss. folding map (colored pen, crayon and pencil) on tracing paper, bound in original printed green paper wrappers (Very Good, old horizontal fold).

 

12.

A Stray Mss. Sketch Map on thick tracing paper (coloured marker and pencil) (small holes with minor loss along horizonal centrefold).

(Damba, July-August 1970).

This manuscript is an ‘after action report’ map, showing the routes of several of the season’s operations, including for OPS. “ABERURA” (February 2 to 11, 1970); “DÚVIDA” (May 13 to 18, 1970); “CATA” (April 4 to 9, 1970) and AC “LIMA” (July 18 to 20, 1970).

 

13.

A Stray Mss. Sketch Map on tracing paper (coloured marker and pencil).

(Damba, July-August 1970).

This manuscript is an ‘after action report’ map, showing the routes of several of the season’s operations, including for OPS. “VONTADE” (February 22 to 25, 1970); “BUSCA” (March 2 to 10, 1970).; “CAÇA” (April 16 to 26, 1970); “DERIVA” (March 26 to 31, 1970); “EMPURRA” (June 22 to 26, 1970); AC “LOIRA” (July 3 to 17, 1970); AC “LUTUS” (July 24 to 28, 1970).

 

14.

“OPERAÇÃO “FARPA” / Transparente de Operações and Annexo Transmissões”.

Damba, August 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typsecript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon, marker and pencil) on a folio sheet of tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript

 

15.

“AC “NOCAL” / Transparente de Operações”.

Damba, September 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, “Labelled Exemplar No. 8’.

Typsecript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon and marker and pencil) on a single folio sheet of tracing paper.

 

16.

“AC “NAIPES” / Confirmação de Ordens Vebais”.

Damba, September 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, “Exemplar No. 4”.

Typsecript, (2pp), plus folding mss. map (colored pen, crayon and marker and pencil) on sheet of tracing paper.

 

17.

“AC “RUBI” / Transparente de Operações and Annexo Transmissões”.

Damba, October 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, “Exemplar No. 4”.

Typsecript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon and marker and pencil) on a single folio sheet of tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript.

 

18.

“OPERAÇÃO “GUME” / Transparente de Operações and Annexo Transmissões”.

Damba, November 1970.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, “Exemplar No. 8”.

Typsecript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon, marker and pencil) on a folio sheet of tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript.

 

19.

“ACÇÃO “VORAZ” / Transparente de Operações and Annexo Transmissões”.

Damba, January 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”, labelled ‘Exemplar No. 7’.

Typsecript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon and pencil) on a folio sheet of tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript.

 

20.

“ACÇÃO “VONTADE” / Transparente de Operações and Annexo Transmissões”.

Damba, January 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typescript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon and pencil) on a folio sheet of tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript.

 

21.

“AC “ZIGUE-ZAGUE” / Transparente de Operações and Annexo Transmissões”.

Damba, March 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”,

Typescript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon and marker and pencil) on a folio sheet of tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript.

 

22.

“ACÇÃO “HOSTL” / Transparente de Operações and Annexo Transmissões”.

Damba, September 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typescript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon and marker and pencil) on a folio sheet of tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript.

 

23.

“AC “HIFEN” / Transparente de Operações and Annexo Transmissões”.

Damba, September 17, 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typsecript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon and marker) on a folio sheet of tracing paper, 1 p. indigo copy of typescript.

 

24.

“AC “LIANA” / Transparente de Operações and Annexo Transmissões”.

Damba, October 15, 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typsecript text and mss. map (colored pen, crayon and marker) on a folio sheet of tracing paper, 2 pp. typescript.

 

25.

“Annexo “A” (Administração e Logística) á o. Transp. Operações p/a / 11a. Intervenção”.

Damba, October 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typescript, 2pp., bearing original signature of Laginha, in blue pen.

 

26.

“Annexo “B” (Transmissões) á O. Transp. Operações para a 11a. Intervenção”.

Damba, October 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typescript, 5 pp., bearing original signature of Laginha, in blue pen.

 

27.

“Aditamento ao Anexo “B” á Ordem Transparente OP. para a 11a/12a. Intervenção”.

(Damba, October 1971).

Marked in mss. “SECRETO”.

Typescript, 1 p., with mss. additions in blue pen.

 

28.

“Annexo “C” (Código de coordinada) á o. Transparente de Operações P/A / 11a. Intervenção”, with Untitled Manuscript Map.

Damba, October 1971.

Typsecript text and mss. chart (colored pen and marker) on a folio sheet of tracing paper, with mss. map (colored pen, raker and crayon) on tracing paper with overlay map with mss. in colured crayon.

 

29.

“Anexo “C” á O. Transparente do Operações. p/a 11a Intervenção”.

Damba, October 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typescript and mss. chart (coloured pen and marker) on a single folio sheet of tracing paper.

 

30.

“Annexo “D” (Informação) Á O. Transp. Operações P/A Intervenção / REF. ORDEM – Tranparente de Operações”.

Damba, October 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typescript, 3 pp., bearing original signature of Laginha, in blue pen.

 

31.

“Anexo “E” á Ordem-Transparente do Operações. 11a Intervenção”.

Damba, October 1971.

Hand-stamped “SECRETO”.

Typescript and mss. map, with additional notes in pencil (coloured pen, marker and crayon with pencil) on a single folio sheet of tracing paper.

 

32.

“Anexo “E” á Ordem-Transparente do Operações. 11a Intervenção”.

Damba, October 29, 1971.

Labelled “Exemplar No. 1”.

Typescript and mss. map (coloured pen, marker and crayon) on a single folio sheet of tracing paper.

 

33.

“Posto Movel ed escolatas a partir de 06NOV71”.

(Damba, November 1971).

Typescript, 1 p., with mss. additions in blue pen.

 

34.

A Stray Manuscript Sketch Map on thick tracing paper (coloured crayon and pencil).

 

35.

Stray Manuscript Sketch Map on thick tracing paper (coloured marker and pen).

 

36.

Manuscript Notes, 2 pp. on octavo, pencil, regarding operations from January 1967 up to July 1970.

 

37.

Agrupamento “E” / Constitução da equipe de orientação fornecer pela CCAÇ. 2613”.

(Damba, late 1971).

Typescript on BCaç. 2891. Letterhead, 1 p., with mss. corrections in blue pen.

 

1. THE RETURN HOME TO PORTUGAL (End 1971 – Beginning 1972)

 

This section features a diverse array of documents and ephemeral items relating to Laginha and BCaç 2891’s departure from Angola, and its return home to base in Tomar.

 

The documents include an invitation for Laginha to meet the Portuguese Governor of Uíge, various other invitations or programs for events, such as for the BCaç 2891’s leaving ceremony; menus and entertainment programs for the trip aboard the ship Veracruz (on which Laginha and BCaç 2891 sailed from Luanda to Lisbon, departing at the end of December 1971); as well as the plans for the arrival ceremony at Tomar.  Interestingly, there is lengthy, manuscript itemized list of whiskeys, gins, cognacs and liqueurs (39,000 Escudos worth!) that Laguna ordered, evidently to celebrate a job well done.  Laginha was subsequently promoted to the rank of Colonel and made the Commandant of the 15^th Infantry Regiment at Tomar.

 

References: N/A –Unrecorded Private Archive. Cf. (for background and context:) ESTADO-MAIOR DO EXÉRCITO. COMISSÃO PARA O ESTUDO DAS CAMPANHAS DO ÁFRICA, Resenha Histórico-Militar das Campanhas de África (1961-1974), vol. 2 (Angola) and vol. 3 (Guiné) (Lisbon, 1989).